Land, Livelihood and Rana Tharu Identity Transformations In Far-Western Nepal by Lam, Lai Ming
Himalaya, the Journal of the
Association for Nepal and
Himalayan Studies
Volume 31 | Number 1 Article 10
8-1-2012
Land, Livelihood and Rana Tharu Identity
Transformations In Far-Western Nepal
Lai Ming Lam
The University of Adelaide, your_laiming@yahoo.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/himalaya
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.
This Research Article is brought to you for free and open access by the
DigitalCommons@Macalester College at DigitalCommons@Macalester
College. It has been accepted for inclusion in Himalaya, the Journal of the
Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies by an authorized
Recommended Citation
Lam, Lai Ming (2012) "Land, Livelihood and Rana Tharu Identity Transformations In Far-Western Nepal," Himalaya, the Journal of the
Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies: Vol. 31: No. 1, Article 10.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/himalaya/vol31/iss1/10
lost their land to hill migrants and their customs 
were threatened. Significant scholarly work has 
documented the ways in which Tharus reacted to 
these social changes (Guneratne 2002; Krauskopff 
2002; Odegaard 1997).
According to the literature, mainstream Tharu 
social reforms can be divided into two periods: 
before the 1990s and after the 1990s.  The Tharu 
reform processes can be summarized in terms of 
two important ideologies, “Sanskritization” and 
“Indigenousness”, which have long influenced the 
history of Nepalese ethnic movements and indeed 
analyses of them. Despite their differences, they 
have been closely linked to issues of livelihood 
and economic matters. In particular, changes in 
landownership have long played a key role in 
shaping relations between high-castes and ethnic 
groups (Caplan 1970; Jones 1967) and inter-ethnic 
group relations (Campbell 1997; Odegaard 1997). 
The concept of Sanskritization was first developed 
by Srinivas (1962) and widely used in describing the 
social mobility of Hindu caste groups. According to 
Jones (1967:63), Sanskritization describes “a process 
by which a lower caste or non-Hindu group adopts 
the ideology or parts of ideology of Hinduism in an 
attempt to raise its economic, political, and social 
status in the caste hierarchy of a given area.”  He 
introduCtion 
The Tharu people are one of the largest ethnic 
minorities in Nepal and they make up 6.6 percent 
of the total population. They live throughout the 
southern belt of Nepal called the Tarai from the east 
through to the west and the adjacent valleys between 
the Churia Range and the Mahabharat called the 
Inner Tarai. Most of the Tharu people are known 
in terms of the territory that they occupy or from 
where they have migrated (Guneratne 2002).1 The 
Tarai had previously suffered from endemic malaria, 
which made extensive cultivation almost impossible. 
Therefore, until the 1950s, it was mainly covered by 
forest with a sparse population consisting mainly of 
Tharus, who were believed to have strong resistance 
to malaria. However, recent history shows that 
the Tarai experienced remarkable socio-economic 
change, including shifts in demography and rising 
conflicts over the control of land. Following the 
success of the malaria eradication program in the 
Tarai region during the 1950s, the area became 
not only favorable to Tharus but all other people, 
particularly the hill population. Many Tharus 
1. For example, Kochila Tharu in eastern Tarai; Chitwaniya 
and Deshaurya Tharu in central Tarai; Dangaura Tharu in western 
Tarai and Rana Tharu in far western Tarai. 
lAi ming lAm  oSaka UnIverSIty and the UnIverSIty of adelaIde 
lAnd, livelihood And rAnA thAru identity 
trAnSFormAtionS in FAr-WeStern nepAl
This paper focuses on the identity of the Tharu, who live throughout the Tarai region. There have been 
social movements among Tharus that aim to promote their ethnic identity by opposing the Hindu 
identity and caste system. However, my ethnographic study of the Rana Tharu, a sub-group of Tharu 
in far-western Nepal, shows that the everyday practice of ethnic identity is fluid and dynamic, and 
cannot be understood in terms of a single ideology.  While ideologies concerning “Sanskritization” and 
“Indigenousness” have dominated the discussion of social reforms and ethnic movements in Nepal, 
I find that a hybrid approach is more relevant to the Rana Tharu situation. The Rana Tharu adopted 
social movement strategies that differed from those of other Tharu groups. Ranas actively used different 
identities and cultural practices to achieve an equal social footing with the dominant hill settlers 
(Pahaaris). They imitated hill cultures on the one hand but also clung to some of their traditional 
customs and were proud of “being Rana.” The motivation behind this was not merely to gain more 
political power but also to obtain a better livelihood and self-identity. This paper adopts a bottom-up 
perspective by viewing ethnicity at the local level. The Rana case illustrates that the nature of ethnicity 
was situational, topical and dynamic. Ranas practiced different forms of identity when reacting to social 
change, history and livelihood. Ranas were engaged in a kind of complex balancing and interweaving of 
identity strategies that combine aspects of the discourses of both Sanskritization and Indigenousness. 
This identity and cultural management was the major force in the transformation of Rana Tharu society.
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points out that the acceptance of caste is the first step in 
Sanskritization, and the adoption of the language, dress and 
religious practices of the high Hindu castes is its core process. 
Levine (1987) further argues that economic and political 
factors are the underlying motivation for Sanskritization by 
ethnic groups.
However, Sanskritization is not the only strategy that 
ethnic groups use to respond to the domination of high 
Hindu caste groups. Sanskritization can be understood 
as a product of the early stage of nation-building (Pfaff-
Czarnecka 1997; Sharma 1997), while Indigenousness 
seems to be a social product that responds to global social 
movements and in particular post-1990s Nepal. According to 
Wilmer and Martin’s (2006) analysis, the indigenous rights 
movement that emerged in the 1990s greatly influenced 
minorities, resource-poor groups and local activists in every 
corner of the world; Nepal was no exception. Meanwhile, 
the downfall of communism in Eastern Europe also inspired 
the first nationwide social movement, the Jan Andolan 
(People’s Movement), which arose in Nepal in 1990, and 
that campaign ended the monarchical Panchayat system. 
Instead of being known as the “Hindu kingdom,” the 1990 
Constitution declared Nepal a multi-ethnic and multi-
lingual state (Gurung 1997).2 This new polity has provided 
an opportunity for many socially deprived ethnic groups 
to “discover pride in their ethnic identity” and become 
“conscious that they can take advantage of the democratic 
situation and bargain for a good share in the political and 
economic pie” (Sharma 1997: 482). Many ethnic groups 
realized the advantages of claiming indigenous status and 
preserving their traditional customs. In the new ethnic 
social movement, most ethnic activists use anti-Hindu 
and anti-caste campaign slogans. Furthermore these 
social campaigns emphasize the promotion of indigenous 
language, religious practices and dress. 
Ideologies that claim to have originated out of 
Sanskritization or Indigenousness have deeply influenced 
Tharu social movements. The earliest Tharu social movement 
emerged in 1949 when the first Tharu organization—the 
Tharu Welfare Society (TWS)—was formed by the elites 
of the eastern Tharus (Guneratne 2002; Krauskopff 2002; 
Odegaard 1997). Its establishment was mainly a response to 
increased contacts with the hill people and their cultures. 
The early strategy of TWS was much like Sanskritization 
because the campaign specifically focused on emulating high 
Hindu caste behavior. Through the promotion of abstinence 
from alcohol, and efforts to have women wear blouses and 
saris instead of traditional dress, the TWS sought to raise the 
social status of Tharus. Many Tharu groups also claimed they 
were descendents of high Hindu castes. For example, Tharus 
from Chitwan believed that they had blood relations with 
2. In 28 May 2008, the elected Assembly voted to abolish the 
monarchy and declared that Nepal has become a democratic republic. 
Rajputs, and Dangauras traced their origin to the Thakurs3 
in Ayodhya and to King Ram Chandra.4  Furthermore, in 
an attempt to improve people’s economic status, the TWS 
advocated reducing life-cycle ceremony expenditures. The 
TWS, however, was perceived to be an elite organization 
and it failed to gain complete support from the different 
Tharu groups throughout the Tarai, particularly those from 
the western Tarai like Dangauras and Ranas. They had not 
even heard of the TWS (Odegaard 1997). The strategies also 
contradicted local Tharu cultural practices.5 As a result, the 
campaign did not have any significant impact. 
Another Tharu organization, the precursor to Backward 
Society Education (BASE), was appeared in 1985. Its 
formation was a reaction to the rising conflict over land 
resources, which most Tharu communities had endured 
for nearly half a century. The founder of that organization 
was a Tharu named Dilli Bahadur Chaudhary from Dang 
district. His family had lost substantial land to Pahaaris and 
was seriously in debt.  Dilli thought illiteracy was one of 
the most important reasons for the subordinate position of 
Tharus so the promotion of education was his top priority.6 
BASE focused on the loss of their land as the most critical 
issue Tharus faced, and as a result it enjoyed widespread 
support from western Tharus. This was the first grass roots 
Tharu social movement. Dilli also successfully drew on the 
ideology of the global indigenous rights movement to assert 
the claim of Tharus as indigenous people. 
On the other hand, TWS also realized that its old 
strategy did not work. Influenced by the new democratic 
reality created by the 1990 people’s movement and the global 
indigenous movement, TWS developed new social reform 
strategies. According to Odegaard (1997), in order to link 
themselves more effectively to the international indigenous 
movement and obtain aid from foreign donor agencies, the 
leaders of TWS sought to portray the Tharu as indigenous 
people. The brotherhood of all Tharus and their indigenous 
status was therefore highlighted in the new ideology. The 
TWS rejected caste ideology and became affiliated with the 
anti-Hindu, anti-Brahmin organization Janajati Mahasangh 
(The Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities). In 1993, 
a well known Tharu leader of the TWS, Ramanand Prasad 
Singh, even wrote a book, The Real Story of the Tharu, which 
claimed that Tharus were descendents of the Buddha. It was 
expected that this claim would not be accepted by all Tharu 
3. Both Ranas and Dangauros claim that the term “Tharu” is a 
misnomer for “Thakur”. Thakur refers to the descendants of kings, 
particularly Rajput descendants (Odegaard 1997).
4. The term “Rajput” refers to plain caste (lit. “Kings’ sons”) (Gellner 
et al. 1997: 547). The claim of being descendants from Rajput is a common 
strategy for many low castes and ethnic groups wanting a higher caste 
position (Odegaard 1997). 
5. Most Tharu groups used to consume much alcohol and a large 
variety of meats. The imposed non-alcoholism and vegetarian policies were 
seldom found at the local level. 
6. For the impacts of BASE on Tharu communities, see Odegaard 
(1997; 1999). 
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groups but its importance lay in raising consciousness of 
Tharu identity. Several national Tharu conferences were held 
during the 1990s and all participants from different Tarai 
areas were aware of the importance of cultural preservation. 
Speaking the Tharu language, wearing Tharu clothes, and 
practicing Tharu rituals were symbols of being Tharus. The 
campaign was summed up as a “pan-Tharu movement” by 
Odegaard (1997). 
One of the most important factors in the consolidation 
of a Tharu idenitity is land. McDonaugh (1989) and 
Guneratne (2002) analyzed the appearance of contemporary 
Tharu movements as being associated with the problem of 
unequal land distribution. Guneratne (2002: 68) concludes 
that “Tharu ethnic identity is formed not on the basis of 
shared cultural features but in terms of particular structural 
relationship to the State.” He points out that “[w]here 
Tharus are concerned, [the mobilizing factor] is access to 
and control of land” (2002: 18). His comment has clearly 
highlighted the close relationships between ethnicity, social 
movement and livelihood.
In this paper, using my ethnographic study of a sub-
Tharu group — the Rana Tharus in far-western Nepal — I 
argue that complex interactions between land, livelihood 
and local histories have played a key role in the identity 
formation of contemporary Rana society. My ethnographic 
data has supported that although they shared the problems 
faced by Tharus throughout the Tarai, the Ranas did not 
join the Pan-Tharu movement but continued to claim a 
high caste status and royal pedigree and preserved their 
unique culture, which distanced them from other Tharus. 
Why did Ranas react to social changes differently than 
other Tharu communities? Most Ranas even refused to be 
labeled “Tharus”. This paper intends to explore the identity 
formation of Ranas through a closer examination of the 
relationships between ethnicity, local histories, livelihoods 
and social changes and their influence on Rana identity 
strategies. The paper echoes the critique of other scholars that 
the problems consist of dichotomous analytical perspectives 
in understanding social relations in South Asian literature 
(Dahal 1979; Fisher 2001; Gellner 1991; Gellner et al. 
1997; Jaffrelot 2003; Levine 1987). Dahal (1979) critiques 
that no cultural group in Nepal can be neatly defined as a 
tribe and that adopting the Hindu-tribal perspective is only 
imagined by scholars and not the people they are studying. 
Levine’s study (1987) of the ethnic identity of three ethnic 
groups in Humla district has shown that the classical social 
categories were not the key determinant of ethnic relations. 
More realistically, economic and political motivations could 
shape ethnic relations. I feel that neither Sanskritization 
nor indigenousness can explain the ethnic character of a 
social group; other approaches are often completely ignored. 
The Rana example indicates that self-identity and ethnic 
relations with others can take on many forms. In addition, 
there is a tendency for scholars to rely too much on ethnicity 
that is focused at the national level and on the elite classes. 
If we adopt a bottom-up perspective by viewing ethnicity 
at the local level, we will find that the nature of ethnicity 
is not a fixed historical and cultural product but it can be 
interpreted in different ways, modified and transformed 
(Eriksen 1993:16). In this process, livelihood issues and 
local histories have significantly influenced the formation 
and transformation of ethnic identity. 
This paper is divided into three parts. In the first part, 
I provide a detailed history of the Ranas. History played a 
critical role in shaping the identity of Ranas as shown in the 
latter stages of this paper. In the second part, I will discuss 
the impacts of social changes on Rana society. In particular 
I will look at how Ranas changed from a majority to a 
minority group, from big landlords to small landholders or 
even nearly landless people because of the land registration 
system, hill migration and the creation of the Shuklaphanta 
Wildlife Reserve. These socio-economic changes mobilized 
the ethnic consciousness of Ranas. In the last part, using the 
ethnographic data, I will analyze how livelihood realities 
interact with local histories and the contemporary ethnic 
movement, resulting in the complex ways Ranas feel about 
themselves and other social groups.7 
the hiStorY oF the rAnA in FAr-weStern 
nepAL
My fieldwork was carried out in villages neighboring 
Shuklaphanta Wildlife Reserve located in the westernmost 
part of Nepal, Kanchanpur district, 750 kilometers from 
the capital city, Kathmandu. Kanchanpur is a part of the 
western Tarai, which Nepal conceded to the British after 
the Anglo-Nepal war (1814-1816).  However, the British 
Government returned it to Nepal in 1860, as a reward for 
assisting the British to quell the Indian Mutiny of 1857. This 
area was known as Naya Muluk and consists of the districts 
of Banke, Bardia, Kailali and Kanchanpur (Guneratne 2002). 
Kanchanpur had previously suffered from an extensive 
malaria epidemic, which made extension of the cultivated 
area almost impossible. Therefore, until 1963, it was mainly 
covered by forest with a sparse population and scattered 
settlements. The majority of the population consisted of 
the indigenous Tharu people who were believed to have 
strong resistance to malaria. Tharus were divided into two 
subgroups—Rana and Dangaura—that were significantly 
different in language and customs (see Odegaard 1997). 
The paper mainly focuses on Rauteli Bichawa Village which 
was the first human settlement in Kanchanpur. The Ranas 
originally settled in this particular forest frontier (KDDC 
2002). 
royal ethnic Label 
Despite the fact that written histories regarding the 
7. Note: In order to protect interviewees’ privacy, some names 
published in this paper are pseudonyms. Also, because the Rana language 
is an unwritten one, I rendered what was said into Devanagari and then 
transliterated it into English. 
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origin of Ranas in Kanchanpur are very few, their past has 
been recorded via local oral traditions. Rauteli Bichawa 
Ranas claimed that they were descendants from the Rajputs 
(Thakuri) of Chittogarh in Rajasthan. When the Muslims 
invaded, the king and his twelve retainers fled Chittogarh 
and some settled in BaraRana (meaning twelve Ranas, 
possibly modern Garwal), while others fled until they came 
to Sukala, which is now under Nepal’s jurisdiction and has 
been officially renamed Shuklaphanta. At that time, there 
was one Brahmin girl in the group and she fell in love with 
one of the retainers. Due to her higher caste status, it was 
agreed that her husband could never enter the kitchen when 
she made food. Their descendants are today known as Rana 
Tharus. The earliest settlements were Iymilia, Hariya, Bataya 
and Bichawa, which were located in the southern part of 
the reserve; settlements were later extended to other areas 
such as the neighboring district, Kailali. Today, the Rana 
population is found in Kanchanpur and Kailali districts in 
Nepal and the States of Uttaranchal and Uttar Pradesh in 
India. Afterwards, the Dangauras who originally came from 
the western district of Dang moved into Rauteli Bichawa and 
worked for Rana families. Some people from the neighboring 
hill districts occasionally visited Rauteli Bichawa Village for 
casual agricultural work. The hill people were afraid to live 
in this region because of their fear of malaria.
However, another version of the origins of the Ranas was 
told by a Rana from another village in Kanchanpur. After 
the downfall of Maha Rana Pratap (a ruler of Rajasthan), 
many Ranas were killed in battle. Instead of taking jauhar 
(in ancient Hindu times, upon the death of their husbands 
in battle, Rajput women were expected to immolate 
themselves), Rana queens were sent to safer places in Nepal 
with their Rana guards. However, they lost their way in the 
forest and settled down, in Kanchanpur, Kailali, Dudhwa 
National Park and Nainital district in the Indian State of 
Uttaranchal. The queens waited for their husbands to join 
them but they did not. So the queens and the Rana guards 
agreed to lead a conjugal life. Their descendants are known 
as Rana Tharus. None of the Rauteli Bichawas Ranas had 
heard this story. The conflicting views about the origins of 
Ranas illustrate the issue of self-identity of Ranas and how 
they relate to others, which will be discussed later in the 
paper. 
According to Srivastava’s (1958) and Krauskopff ’s (2002) 
analysis, because of the close links Ranas have to India 
and their living in isolation, a strong Nepali identity did 
not develop in the Rana community. Both of them point 
out that Ranas do not claim Tharu ethnicity but often cling 
to their royal pedigree, which left deep marks on every 
aspect of their culture (see examples below). This suggests 
that despite the rise of democracy and ethnic politics in 
Nepal since the 1990s, the Rana social movement is more 
influenced by the tribal rights movements in India. For 
example, in 1995, Ranas formed their own organization 
called the Rana Reform Society (Rana Sudhar Samaj) and it 
is a movement more like the earlier caste association marked 
by “Sanskritization”.8 
Rauteli Bichawa Ranas share the same situation. My 
ethnographic data shows that administrative control of the 
State in the Kanchanpur district was very limited. I was 
told that some old Rauteli Bichawa Ranas did not know that 
Nepal existed as a country. Interactions with the outside 
world were almost absent in geographically isolated villages 
like Rauteli Bichawa. Contact between the State and Rauteli 
Bichawa has existed for less than a century. According to a 
Rana ex-Jimidar9, the first time government officers visited 
the place was c. 1935. This means that after the restoration 
of the Naya Muluk to Nepal in 1860, the Rauteli Bichawa 
has not been governed directly by the State for 72 years, 
only though local functionaries like the jimidars. The power 
was thus wielded by local elites who owned large amounts 
of land. The ex-leader of Rauteli Bichawa, Mandal Upadhya, 
pointed out that the existence of Rana settlements was not 
known to the State until the 1950s. Such historical and 
geographical circumstances thus contributed to alternative 
social movements in the Rana community to those 
developing among other Tharu groups.  
SoCiAL ChAngeS SinCe the 1950s
In Nepal, many studies have demonstrated that 
ethnicity is dynamic during different political periods 
(Pfaff-Czarnecka 1997; Sharma 1997) and the change 
in landownership is a crucial factor for shaping ethnic 
relationships (Caplan 1970; Jones 1967). It is likely that 
when more violent social changes occur, a more active 
ethnic consciousness develops among social groups.  Similar 
to other Tharu groups, recent history shows that Rauteli 
Bichawa Ranas experienced remarkable socio-economic 
changes, including shifts in demography and rising conflicts 
over land resources. The government enacted a resettlement 
and land tenure policy and the introduction of protected 
areas that were responsible for these changes. As a result, 
Ranas became a minority group and lost substantial land 
to hill migrants and the State. These dramatic changes in 
socio-economic status made them search for a new identity. 
government-activated resettlement programs and 
Forest loss
Following the success of the malaria eradication program 
in the Tarai region during the 1950s, Kanchanpur became 
more hospitable not only to Tharus but for all other people, 
particularly the hill population. The biggest resettlement 
project was carried out in Kanchanpur in 1971. Thousands 
8. In his detailed analysis on cultural changes of Ranas, Srivastava 
(1958) observes that the caste climbing based social movement is not 
necessarily adopted by all classes of Ranas. At the local level, the identity 
strategies are often shaped by different livelihood realities. 
9. Jimidars were the local elites who were officially appointed by the 
State to collect taxes from other cultivators. They often owned vast amounts 
of land and their influence on local politics and economics was significant. 
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of families from Jhapa, Bhojpur, Chitwan, Dhading and 
Nawalparasi were resettled on forest land in Kanchanpur. 
Apart from government-sponsored resettled programs, large 
scale uncontrolled migration also occurred in Kachanpur 
following the eradication of malaria. Many migrants from 
neighboring hill districts moved down in order to search for 
fertile land, better education and job opportunities. 
This migration resulted in Kanchanpur changing from 
the least populated district in the Tarai to becoming a major 
destination for hill migrants. In 1961, it had a population 
of only 17,000. With an average 6.02 percent growth, its 
population reached 68,863 in 1972 and 377,899 in 2000. 
The increase was largely generated by the influx of hill 
migrants over the past thirty years (Pandey & Yonzon 2003). 
Nowadays, the dominant population consists of the hill 
migrants rather than the indigenous Tharu. The Nepalese 
government ever distinguishes between different Tharu 
groups in the national population census, so Ranas are only 
broadly categorized into the “Tharu” group. According to 
the 2001 census data, the caste and ethnic distribution of 
the population in Kanchanpur were as follows: Chettri (30 
percent); Tharu (20 percent); Brahmin (17 percent); Dalits 
(14 percent); Thakuri (5 percent); and others (14 percent). 
The dramatic increase in population in Kanchanpur 
after the 1950s was accompanied by the significant loss 
of forest tracts due to increasing demands on agricultural 
land and forest-related resources. Responding to the 
shrinkage of forest, the government established the Royal 
Shuklaphanta Wildlife Reserve (hereafter referred to as 
“the Park”) in 1976 with a total area 155 sq.km. However, 
the ongoing development of new settlements adjoining 
the Park and illegal settlement in the whole district has 
hindered preservation efforts in the Park. Activities such as 
logging, grazing and poaching have seriously damaged the 
natural environment and wildlife habitats. The reserve was 
therefore considered too small for wildlife and encroached 
on by humans too often (Bhattarai 2001). An extension of 
the Park was launched in 1981 to strengthen conservation of 
the flora and fauna in the area (Bhattarai 2001). It proposed 
to establish another 155 sq.km for the reserve. This time, a 
total of seventeen existing blocks of five villages inside the 
proposed extension area were affected and Rauteli Bichawa 
was the largest affected village. 
Although official data concerning the Rana population 
in Rauteli Bichawa was not available, two sources of data I 
collected from the field showed that the village experienced 
significant changes in its demographic landscape due to the 
hill migration and the creation of the Park. According to ex-
leader Vagat Rana, the total population of Rauteli Bichawa at 
one time had been estimated to be about 30,000 to 35,000 
of which 20,000 were Ranas. An ex-secretary of the Rauteli 
Bichawa Village Development Committee Office indicated 
that before the displacement, the total population of Rauteli 
Bichawa was 9,956 with 1,642 households in 2000. The 
largest population group consisted of twice-born Pahaaris—
Chettri (33.81 percent) and Brahmin (9.78 percent)-- and 
the Tharu population was second (31.45 percent). The third 
group consisted of untouchable castes (7.48 percent). A 
secretary who was a local villager, and therefore familiar 
with the composition of the local population, pointed out 
that the total number of Rana households was 350 (21 
percent) and they were distributed unevenly in the nine 
wards. After the park-induced displacement in 2001, Rauteli 
Bichawa became the smallest administrative village in 
Kanchanpur district with only three existing hamlets, while 
six wards were included in the new boundary of the park. 
A total of 1,061 households from Wards 1 to 6 and a few 
from Wards 7 and 8 were therefore relocated, including 204 
Rana households. The displacement has resulted in the total 
number of Rana households living in Rauteli Bichawa Village 
dropping to only 150. The scope of this paper covers both 
resettled and non-resettled Rauteli Bichawa Ranas. While 
the above data on Rana population seem contradictory, they 
reflect the fact that the Rana population in Rauteli Bichawa 
has declined dramatically in recent decades. 
the transformation of Landownership 
Meanwhile, Kanchanpur also experienced substantial 
transformation of landownership. Until the 1930s, the 
development of property rights was restricted to the 
Tarai region. At that time, property rights were granted 
to Tarai cultivators in return for paying taxes to the local 
administration. These cultivators were allowed to sell or to 
mortgage their raikar10 land under certain conditions. This 
was a response to the problem of abundant wasteland in 
the Tarai so a more competitive and flexible land policy 
was introduced to encourage economic development. At 
that time, the State had to rely on the cooperation of local 
elites to exercise its power over land resources indirectly. 
This situation changed completely after the introduction of 
a series of land reforms in the 1950s. Under this new land 
policy, all raikar cultivators were upgraded to landowners 
who could trade their land freely and landownership would 
only be granted through official land registration documents 
and an obligation to pay taxes to the State (Regmi 1999). 
The policy caused dramatic changes in landownership in 
Kanchanpur. Before the hill migration and land reforms, 
almost all land in Kanchanpur was controlled by indigenous 
Ranas. Afterwards, landownership rapidly transferred from 
the Ranas to the hill migrants. There was no exception for 
Rauteli Bichawa Ranas. I was told by local informants that 
Ranas were dispersed because of hill migration and park-
induced resettlement, and many of them became small 
landholders or even landless.
10. Land was the property of the State and this type of land was 
known as raikar. All land tenure in Kanchanpur was thus considered part of 
the raikar system. Under this state-as-landlord system, the government had 
absolute power to grant and confiscate land and could appropriate land for 
its own needs (Regmi 1963; 1999). 
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identitY trAnSFormAtionS in rAnA 
SoCietY
The identity of Rauteli Bichawa Ranas is closely related 
to territories, common origin and shared cultural practices. 
They believe that their ancestors came from India and they 
are decendants of Rajputs. They speak the Rana language, 
wear traditional dress and practice the same customs. 
All of these make them a distinctive ethnic group (Smith 
1986). However, Rana ethnicity is not solely bound up with 
cultural and historical factors. Its development is in fact a 
balanced response to being poor, a minority and to claiming 
royal descent. Before I turn to discuss the identity of Rauteli 
Bichawa Ranas, it is worth looking at the work of Odegaard 
(1997) and Skar (1999). Their studies show that the Rana 
identity is dynamic and takes on many different forms.
An Alternative rana reform movement: hindu and 
tribal 
The most extensive study of Rana social reforms was 
done by Odegaard (1997), who observes that “contrary 
to the pan-ideology which rejects the hierarchical caste 
structure, the Ranas’ strategy [is to] optimize social status 
first in what is commonly referred to as caste-climbing.” 
She points out that the most critical obstacle for Ranas in 
Nepal to overcome in their drive to affiliate with the pan-
Tharu movement was their “caste” status. Like the Ranas 
in India, they claimed they were descendents of Rajputs. 
They strongly felt that they were not indigenous to the 
Tarai and believed they originally derived from Chittogarh 
in India (Odegaard 1997). Their belief hardly fitted into 
the new ideology of the pan-Tharu movement. Moreover, 
Ranas lived in the remote western Tarai, and this separated 
them from the other Tharu groups. They had very few 
opportunities to participate in the pan-Tharu movement. 
For example, when the first International Tharu Culture 
Conference was held in 1995, participants included Tharus 
from both India and Nepal except for Ranas from Kalaili and 
Kanchanpur (Odegaard 1997). The Rana elites blamed the 
problems of distance and non-existence of well-established 
Rana organizations as the two major reasons for their non-
participation. As Odegaard (1997) records, an influential 
member of the Rana elite queried the unity of all Tharu 
groups in one social movement, commenting that “Since 
there are so many Tharu groups differing in several aspects, 
a collective reform movement becomes difficult. Each group 
has to start with itself.”
In fact, the Rana reform moment in Nepal was more 
likely a part of a pan-Rana movement in India (Krauskopff 
2002; Odegaard 1997; Srivastava 1958). The Rana social 
movement in India had started in the 1930s. The Rana 
community was aware of its own social and economic 
backwardness so 18 rules were set up to improve their social 
status. For example, alcohol and meat (particularly pork) 
were prohibited and social prestige was not attached to social 
practices like bride price, intercaste marriage11 and sharing 
water pipes with lower castes. Ranas, furthermore, wore the 
holy cord as twice-born castes did. Later, the reform focused 
on adopting high Hindu castes’ socio-religious practices. 
The Rana elites advocated that Ranas should use Brahmins 
for various ceremonies and Rana women should behave 
like high Hindu caste women. However, the reform did not 
achieve much at the local level, as many Ranas still practiced 
their old customs. In 1967, the Ranas with other five tribes 
in Uttar Pradesh successfully got themselves declared as a 
“scheduled tribe,” which meant they had certain privileges 
in education and political participation. The better-off Ranas 
in India were admired by the Ranas in Nepal. 
Motivated by the success of Ranas in India and sharing 
their origin myth encouraged Ranas in Nepal to participate 
in the pan-Rana movement, rather than the pan-Tharu 
movement. According to Odegaard (1997), the Rana social 
reform movement in Nepal started in 1991 and an elite-
based organization known as Rana Samaaj Sudhaar (Rana 
Reform Society) was formed. Instead of struggling for more 
political power, it emphasized that Ranas’ first priority was 
to modernize. Two large Rana meetings were held in Kalaili 
and Kanchanpur in 1993 and 1994 respectively. More than 
250 Rana delegates attended these meetings and most of 
them were educated elites who owned much land. They 
wanted to be more ‘developed’ and share equal social status 
with the other castes of Nepal. The reform activists strongly 
felt that Ranas should abandon their old concerns of simply 
living as they put it, “to eat and sleep”. They advocated 
the abolition of customs like Magani (child marriage), and 
advocated learning Nepali and providing a good education 
for children. These approaches were similar to that of the 
pan-Rana movement in India.
Another anthropologist, Harald Skar, shows in his study 
on Rana identity (1999) that most Ranas in Nepal think 
themselves as being Hindus. He points out that Ranas 
never eat beef or buffalo because such food is perceived 
as low-status, impure and only to be consumed by the 
lower caste groups. Although according to tradition Ranas 
bury their dead along riverbanks, they now also perform 
a ritual of sending the spirit down the river, and go to the 
holy shrine of Haridwar to perform rituals as Hindus, in 
honor of their dead. After long contact with Ranas, Skar 
concludes that the identities of Ranas are both situational 
and topical because Ranas categorize themselves as Hindu 
and tribal. My observation of everyday ethnic relations of 
Rauteli Bichawa Ranas echoes these scholars’ analyses. 
Furthermore, my data shows that ethnicity is a product of 
specific political circumstances, but its nature varies. It is a 
strategy that human agents can utilize and modify on the 
basis of their histories and livelihood realities. Growing 
11. Inter-caste marriage remains contentious in Nepal as marriages 
in the Hindu society are caste driven. Inter-caste marriages are considered 
to be a sin and are not approved by the elders. As a result, the couple will 
suffer the loss of social prestige. 
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from their experience of similar social changes (e.g. 
the transformation of landownership, the introduction 
of dominant hill cultures and conservation policies), 
Rana social movements represent an alternative to the 
mainstream pan-Tharu movement.
multiple identities as a Social Climbing 
Strategy
My ethnographic data has shown that caste ideology 
had significantly influenced the self-identity of Ranas 
and their relationships with other Tharu groups. A 
detailed look at the myth of Rana origin allows us 
to examine more closely how Ranas thought about 
and valued themselves. Fisher (2001) comments that 
different versions of their origin myth allow people 
to adapt to different socio-political environments. An 
absence of written histories about Kanchanpur Ranas 
was one of the major difficulties of my fieldwork; Ranas 
created histories of origin that favored their interests. 
My discussion of their myth of origin therefore does 
not focus on historical reliability but on understanding 
what Ranas claim themselves to be and their motivation 
for this claim.  
In one version of their myth, a former Rana 
village leader, Vagat Rana, claims that Ranas were not 
Tharus.12  He explained that Ranas had become Tharus 
today because people did not know much about their 
own history: 
Our ancestors moved from India to here to 
escape the Muslim enemies. At that time, 
they were scared of being killed. Later, they 
realized that their features were similar to the 
Tarai people - Tharus. With a consideration of 
defence, they started to introduce themselves 
as ‘Tharus’. As time went by, people often call 
us ‘Tharus’. Actually, we are very different 
from ‘Tharus’; we are Rana.
He also argued that Ranas were in fact the same caste 
as the Chettri (see Figure 1). His evidence was that Rana 
males used to wear the sacred thread, which was the most 
important symbol of people from twice-born castes. He 
blamed the disappearance of this particular tradition on 
security concerns. In the past, wearing the sacred thread 
made their ancestors vulnerable to attacks by Muslims, for 
their status could easily be seen. Therefore, they chose to 
take off their threads, and since then Rana males do not 
wear the sacred thread any more.12
Similar findings are noted by Odegaard (1997). She 
12. As mentioned in earlier sections, practicing twice-born caste 
culture was one of the major strategies used by the pan-Rana movement 
in India. Although there was no evidence that Ranas from RSWR were 
influenced by the pan-Rana movement, they adopted similar approaches to 
the Ranas in India.
observes that Ranas from Kalaili district insisted on the 
belief that Ranas were descendants of Rajputs. They 
criticized the version of the myth that claimed that Ranas 
were descended from the queen and her servant, claiming 
this was incorrect and an insult to Ranas.13 According to one 
of the most influential Ranas in Kalaili, Hari Lal Rana, Ranas 
were descended from a Rajput and a Brahmin. This version 
was the same as the one I heard from Rauteli Bichawa Ranas. 
He further claimed that Ranas were descendants of the 
glorious and famous Hindu hero Maharana Pratap Singh.14 
He remarked:
We Ranas are not indigenous . . . We came from 
India, from Rajasthan. . . . The Rana Thakurs 
are thus descendents of Rajputs and Brahmins. 
We always wear the white turnan (phagya) 
and we always had a knife (talwar) in our belt 
(like Rajputs/ warriors) . . . We also take our 
purification baths together with people from 
Rajasthan and not with other Tharus and 
Nepalese people (cited in Odegaard 1997). 
13. For a detailed account of different versions of the myth of Rana 
origins, see Odegaard (1997). 
14. Maharana Pratap Singh remains a great hero in the eyes of most 
Indians because he never compromised his honor and he fought the 
Moghul invaders bravely.
Figure 1. the rana grooM Still holDS a kniFe (in hiS right hanD) to SyMBolize the 
warrior StatuS oF ancient tiMeS. (photo: lai Ming laM).
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Hari Lal Rana’s statement clearly demonstrated 
that Ranas utilize caste ideology and the origin myth to 
identify themselves as high caste people and disassociate 
themselves from other lower caste groups, particularly the 
Tharus. This happened in the relationship between Ranas 
and Dangauras. Most Rauteli Bichawa Ranas were reluctant 
to accept the name “Tharu” because Tharu meant lower 
caste groups in the eyes of most Ranas. Many old Ranas 
still felt that Dangauras were backward people and they did 
not share the same hygienic concerns as the Ranas did.15 
Even though the Dangauras had experienced significant 
social and economic development16 and this was widely 
recognized by Ranas, deeply-rooted prejudices affected the 
ethnic relations between Ranas and Dangauras. A comment 
made by a young and educated Rana clearly illustrates 
the sharp caste and cultural divisions between these two 
groups:
We are different. We don’t practise 
intermarriage.17 I think Rana is better than 
Dangauras. But the government only calls us 
“Tharus.” Dangauras are from the eastern part 
of Nepal [actually, Dangauras are from western 
part of Nepal. East is a relative term] and close 
to the government so they are smarter than us. 
I don’t think there is any domination between 
us, however, I never can agree we are the same 
caste. We write our name Rana and they write 
Dangauras or Chaudhary. Although I know 
we are both categorised as the second lower 
caste under the caste system, we have our own 
cultures. Dangauras are always socially lower 
than Ranas.
It was apparent that the Rana acceptance of caste ideology 
and social exclusion of “lower caste” Dangauras fit into the 
typical caste-climbing approach called Sanskritization. 
However, we cannot reject the existence of egalitarian 
concepts in the formation of Rana identity. It was ironic 
that twice-born Pahaaris and Ranas had different caste 
positions under the Muluki Ain (national legal code). While 
the Pahaaris (Brahmins and Chhetris) were ranked high 
and granted great social prestige, Ranas were categorized 
as the second lowest caste (masinya matwali or enslavable 
alcohol-drinkers). Although this externally imposed social 
hierarchy was probably not accepted by Ranas, it influenced 
their ethnic relations with Pahaaris. Most RSWR Ranas in 
15. I observed that the Ranas were very concerned about cleanliness, 
so their houses always looked very tidy compared to those of other ethnic 
groups. 
16. The Dangauras were very adaptable and many of them were 
economically and educationally more advanced than Ranas. 
17. In analyzing the relationships between hierarchy and endogamy, 
Quigley (1993: 112) points out that strict control over affiliation by 
marriage is one way for a cultural group to prevent another group entering 
its ranks. 
fact felt that they shared the same social status as Pahaaris. 
They interpreted the castes in a different way. They thought 
different castes meant different jaats and did not imply any 
social ranking. They did not feel themselves inferior to the 
Pahaaris. One Rana shared his view of caste with me: 
Caste, I know, I know there are five different 
caste groups (jaats) under the caste system. 
I don’t think there are ranking relations 
between different caste groups. These groups 
are different only because they have different 
cultural practices and lineage.
One wealthier Rana expressed his feeling of being a 
Rana in this way:
My parents were born in this caste. I grew up 
in this culture. I don’t have any feeling that 
I want to be of other castes. I love my own 
culture. I feel that there are no differences 
between Brahmins, Chettris and Ranas. The 
only problem is that different caste people will 
try to dominate others. Just like some people 
will easily say that you are Ranas or Brahmins 
to justify your social position. I don’t like this 
kind of domination.
Similar feelings were shared by another poorer Rana:
I never feel sad to be a Rana. Maybe Brahmins 
will think they are big people. Pahaaris will 
think they are big people. I think I am (Rana) 
also big people. I feel there is no difference 
between Ranas and other caste people. 
Probably, the only difference is that we are 
poor because we can’t provide education to 
our children. 
Ranas do not passively accept caste ideology and it does 
not determine their self-identity. The formation of Rana 
identity is a process of negotiation between local histories, 
local power structures and the caste system. This view is 
shared by Russell (1997: 326-327), who argues that “rather 
than seeing people as passive recipients of the forces of 
modernization, Hinduization, or nation-state, prefers to see 
them as potentially active manipulators, negotiators and 
transformers of the cultural forms.” In the case of Rauteli 
Bichawa Ranas, they selectively used and modified the caste 
system and articulated it into their histories and finally a 
local caste category was established whereby Ranas had a 
higher social ranking than Dangauras and the same caste 
position as Pahaari Chhetris.
It is important for us to understand what caste means to 
the people themselves. As Hocart puts it:
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We must search for that principle not in our 
minds, but in the minds of those people who 
practice the caste system, who have daily 
experience of it, and are thus most likely to 
have a feeling for what is most essential in it 
(cited in Dumont & Pocock 1958: 46). 
Odegaard also comments that:
There exists no single caste system, but local 
and regional variations of communities which 
arrange themselves hierarchically in relation 
to one another within a particular territory 
(1997).
Ranas and Pahaaris positioned themselves as higher 
caste groups and Dangauras as inferior to them. The multiple 
identities of Ranas became their management strategy18 
for dealing with everyday ethnic relationships. However, 
similar to the situation concerning the Dangauras, no matter 
how Ranas reclaimed their high caste status, they were not 
treated as such by the twice-born Pahaaris. A comment 
made by one Iymilia Pahaari woman indicates that different 
caste status remained a deep-rooted demarcation for Ranas 
and Pahaaris. Another version regarding the origin of Ranas 
was provided by her, and this story was generally believed 
by most old Pahaaris settlers:
Ranas are Tharus. This is the fact. Long time 
ago, those Tharus worked in the palace. Later, 
the Rana king was killed and his daughter 
fled with a group of Tharu. Finally, she got 
married to one of the Tharus. After that, 
their descendants become ‘Rana Tharus’. 
Fundamentally, they are no different to 
Tharus. Like my father, he even perceives 
Ranas as an ‘untouchable caste’ and refuses to 
accept their water.
Cultural Adaptation and preservation and identity 
Consciousness 
Over the last few decades, due to the influence of hill 
cultures, Rauteli Bichawa Ranas have made significant 
changes to their own cultural practices to fit the high caste 
model. These included changes in gender relations and 
many customs. For example, the outsiders’ image of Rana 
males’ inferior social status in the family and in society 
made them embarrassed, particularly when they interacted 
18. Regarding the concept of “management identity” see Allen 
(1997) and Russell (1997). For example, Allen (1997) points out that the 
Thulung community has its own interpretation for the difference between 
untouchable castes, higher Hindu castes and themselves. Russell also 
notes (1997:331) that the identity labels of the Yakkha group in Nepal are 
changing in terms of home, village, the nation-state, the world beyond, and 
the spirit world. 
with Pahaaris. Rana males therefore wanted to “reportray” 
their domination over women to enhance their self-esteem. 
Most Rana women pointed out that they suffered more at 
the hands of male authority than in the past. The level of 
control significantly increased particularly after marriage 
and motherhood. They often needed permission from their 
husbands if they planned to go somewhere (see detailed 
discussion on gender relations in Rana society in Lam 
2009).  Hill cultures also significant influenced the daily 
customs of Ranas. For example, some Rana elites promoted 
the prohibition of pork consumption and followed the 
high Hindu castes by only eating goat meat. Traditionally, 
Deepawali was not only a Hindu festival but also a special 
time for Ranas’ ritual ceremonies to honour their ancestors. 
Unlike the Pahaari customs, Ranas’ Deepawali was not a 
five-day-long festival. They would only celebrate one special 
day which was the last day of Deepawali (Bhaaitikka). On 
the night before Bhaaitikka, they would kill many chickens 
to worship their gods before sunrise. For the poor Ranas, 
they would make flour-chicken for worship. After that, 
sisters would give tikka (red powder on the forehead means 
blessing) and flower necklaces to their brothers. Nowadays, 
most relatively wealthier Ranas emulate Pahaari cultures by 
worshipping dogs and cows.
Furthermore, more Ranas spoke Nepali and gave up their 
traditional dress. One old Rana man blamed the loss of Rana 
tradition on the moving-in of Pahaaris: “when we wore our 
traditional clothes, Pahaaris would find it easy to say ‘how 
nice’ (kati raamro). We men felt very uncomfortable and 
finally gave up wearing our clothes any more” (see Figure 
2). On the other hand, Rana women turned to wearing more 
saris because they were cheaper and more comfortable to 
work in as they attended to their duties in the fields. It was 
difficult to determine if the transformation of Rana culture 
was due to Sanskritization19 because the new Rana cultural 
practices might not have the same meaning attached to them 
as Pahaari cultures do. On the contrary, often they were a 
form of articulation of both Ranas and Pahaaris cultures. 
A similar observation is made by Buggeland (1994) in her 
study of Kali worship among the Santals of Nepal. She finds 
that although the ways in which Santals worshipped Kali are 
similar as Pahaaris, Santals interpret the ritual differently as 
part of their own cosmological ideology. Russell (1997: 370) 
also comments that scholars’ recognition of ‘culture itself 
may be subject to change’ is important for understanding the 
formation of ethnicity. As Srivastava (1958) points out, the 
cultural changes of Ranas are through adoption, assimilation 
and acculturation. 
19. Allen (1997: 318) argues that cultural assimilation or process of 
Sanskritization may not necessarily be decided by non-Hindu castes and 
Hindu castes because these cultural practices are deeply embedded in their 
daily interactions.
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Figure 2. Few young rana MaleS wear traDitional clothing (long white 
DreSS with reD DecorationS) to perForM the holi Dance. (photo: lai Ming 
laM).
Rauteli Bichawa Ranas incorporated aspects of many 
new cultures into their own in order to make themselves 
fit into the wider society. However, when such cultural 
adaptation occurred in Rana society, a sense of cultural 
preservation emerged along with it. This was a challenge 
in retaining ethnicity. In the identity management process, 
the more Ranas adopted the new cultures, the more they 
were aware of their own culture. This was evident with 
the Rauteli Bichawa Ranas. Speaking the Rana language, 
wearing the traditional Gangriya dress and celebrating 
the Holi festival all became symbolic of being Rana. This 
cultural revival might not help Ranas resist the continuous 
influence of hill cultures which have more vigorous and 
powerful identities. However, when opportunities do 
become available to Ranas, their traditional cultures would 
be a powerful weapon with which to reclaim the value of 
the group within a complex and hierarchical society. A few 
examples below help to illustrate this argument.
Firstly, language was a key element in maintaining the 
Rana identity. In my observation, many older generation 
Rauteli Bichawa Ranas hesitated in claiming to be Nepalese 
because of different languages. One old Rana said to me 
that “I feel good to be a Rana. I don’t know why I have 
this feeling. You know, we have one national language — 
Nepali — but I can’t speak it.” The story of a young Rana 
demonstrated how linguistic barriers prevented the Ranas 
from being assimilated into the cultural melting pot to some 
extent.20 Krishanna Rana was thirteen years old and had 
completed grade four. He found it very difficult to continue 
his studies because he could not speak Nepali very well. In 
20. On the other hand, language is one of the main reasons for 
increasing social exclusion because it often prevents powerless social groups 
from integrating into mainstream society (Gaige 1975). 
his class, less than ten percent of students were Ranas. He 
was shy about learning and speaking Nepali and finally he 
decided to quit his studies. He said that because he spoke 
the Rana language, he considered himself to be a Rana 
rather than a Nepalese:
I feel good when people call me Rana. I really 
feel myself a Rana. I never think I am a Nepali 
and I have no intention of being a Nepali also. 
Probably, the basic criterion for being a Nepali 
is to learn Nepali. I can’t write and speak 
Nepali well. I always feel uncomfortable when 
speaking Nepali. I prefer to speak the Rana 
language if the choice is available.
Secondly, the Rana identity was also reflected in the Holi 
celebration. Although most Rauteli Bichawa Ranas were 
not enthusiastic about celebrating Holi due to economic 
hardship, the symbolic meaning of Holi to most Ranas 
should not be neglected. Celebrating Holi was not simply 
a matter of praying to the Hindu gods; it represented the 
solidarity of Rana society and ethnic identity. Today, its 
continuation symbolizes the survival of Rana cultures. I 
recalled an instance during the March 2005 Holi festival 
in a new resettlement area. A few dancing groups formed 
as usual but the festival atmosphere was strained among 
the displaced Rauteli Bichawa Ranas. Only a few Rana 
families planned to invite dancing groups and organized 
Holi parties. My host family in the resettlement area was 
one of the wealthiest Rana families but they did not plan 
to do so. Three nights of celebrations passed and by noon 
on the fourth day, I still did not hear any news whether 
the celebration could continue. The  Ranas felt sad that 
this year’s Holi celebration activities lasted only three 
days. Suddenly, a celebration was held by my host family 
and the decision was made by the elder son who had just 
come back from another village. That night, the family 
used almost 50 kilos of rice and 30 kilos of potatoes. Later, 
the son explained that the Holi celebration was one of the 
most important Rana customs and they used to have a one-
month long celebration, so he felt very upset when he heard 
the celebration had to stop on the third day. He pointed 
out that increased poverty and separated population had 
weakened the cultural identity of Ranas:
Of course, nowadays we can’t celebrate festivals 
together because all of us are getting poorer 
than before. When it was inside the park, we 
were always together. Today, we are resettled 
in different areas and we are far from each 
other. People also get less food than before so 
everyone just looks for their own family how 
to survive and are not interested in celebrating 
festivals together. If we were not moved out, 
we would have a big Holi celebration like those 
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Ranas in the old settlements. Also, now the new 
generation is really not interested in celebration, 
they can’t sing Rana Holi songs. In my place, 
there are only a few Rana families, so I need to 
bring back my children to here to see how Rana 
celebrate Holi. I feel if Ranas only look after 
themselves, many changes will happen in the 
future. Like my son, he never knows what Rana 
or Holi are. Ten years ago, I celebrated Holi and 
it was really very nice, may be after 10 years, all 
these traditions will disappear.
He also mentioned that Ranas were proud of their culture 
and would like to continue religious performances such as 
Holi dancing if opportunities arose. On hearing this, I told 
him that even though film makers might be interested in 
shooting a film regarding the Holi celebration, it would be 
too late because Rana culture was disappearing rapidly. He 
disagreed with me by saying, “If we were informed earlier 
about the film maker’s visit, we would prepare and perform 
our cultures to him, particularly our women would wear the 
local Gangriya dress again.” One educated Rana knew I had 
planned to write a book about Rana society; he repeatedly 
requested me to include the Rana Holi celebration.  
The third example concerned Rana dress. As I have 
mentioned previously, the traditional Rana dress was 
completely replaced by the mainstream Nepalese dress for 
social and economic reasons. However, this transformed 
culture did not necessarily mean the abandonment of the old 
culture. Both new and old cultures existed simultaneously 
but served different functions. Wearing traditional dress had 
become a cultural performance (see Figure 3 and 4 below). 
During my fieldwork, I was asked many times to photograph 
Rana women. They would emphasize that they were wearing 
the traditional Gangriya. Obviously, they were aware that to 
others their clothes were unique and were confident that this 
tradition would attract outsiders like me. Since most Rana 
women did not know how to sew their own Gangriya like 
older generations did, they had to borrow Gangriya from 
friends. They all felt that Gangriya was beautiful. After taking 
photos, one Rana woman said to me that the photo was a 
good memento of her life. Realizing the value of gangriya, a 
Rana woman even sold this “tradition” to me. She made a new 
gangriya and sold it to me for Rs 3,000. Odegaard expresses 
a similar finding (1997). She was requested to take photos 
many times by Dangauras, and Ranas during her fieldwork. 
Odegaard shared her feelings in this way:
When Tharus in Geti saw that “important 
people” and foreigners were interested in Tharu 
culture, their apprehension of “their culture” 
also changed. The fact that they were urged to 
“protect’ their culture” has engendered a new 
self-understanding and a new relation to their 
cultural identity (1997).
Figure 3. no Matter how DiFFicult it iS to wear GanGriya anD to put SilVer 
ringS on their legS, ranaS were Still enthuSiaStic aBout Showing their 
cuStoM to Me. (photo: lai Ming laM).
ConCLuSion
This paper has discussed the interdependent and 
dynamic relationships of ethnicity, history, cultural 
practices and changes in people’s livelihoods. The above 
discussion has not argued that Ranas have a strong 
sense of cultural preservation. Instead, it demonstrated 
that after extensive contacts with others, the formation 
and transformation of Rana ethnic identity and cultural 
practices were so complicated that one single approach 
could not explain it. The ethnographic data supported 
the contention that the Rana reform movement was 
neither one of Sanskritization or Indigenousness. Their 
identities are many-stranded, situational and topical 
(Skar 1999: 196-198). They resisted the “Tharu” label 
and strongly claimed to have the same caste status as the 
high Hindu caste Pahaaris. Regarding cultural changes, 
Rana did not accept all hill cultures but they selected and 
modified aspects of them into their own, for example the 
Dipawaali festival. Meanwhile, vanishing aspects of their 
culture—particularly Holi and traditional dress—might 
be caused by many factors such as conservation-induced 
displacement and poverty. Therefore they had to adjust 
the way they responded to these economic realties. When 
cultural reforms became necessary in Rana society, Ranas’ 
self-consciousness of their own culture’s values increased 
simultaneously. Indeed, these practices became a cultural 
performance and a new meaning emerged.
My finding echoes that of Oakdale (2004) and Turner 
(1991). Their studies have clearly shown that people from 
traditional societies, like those of Indians in Brazil, are 
having their cultures modified or recreated after contact 
with outside world. In the process of cultural change, instead 
of being completely assimilated, they actively negotiate and 
manage their identity and cultural practice. For example, 
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Turner observes that in the 1960s, almost all 
Kayapo Indians wore full Western clothing. 
However, since the 1990s, they have chosen 
“half-and half” with long pants or shorts and 
no shirt or jacket. Their faces and upper bodies 
are painted and they wear traditional shell 
necklaces and bead earrings. The explanation 
for this change is the global indigenous 
movement; Kayapo Indians increasingly value 
the social, economic and political traditions of 
their own cultures. It is thus predictable that the 
Rana culture will be further transformed in this 
way. The articulation of growing ethnic identity 
and the new national and global political 
environments are an opportunity for Ranas to 
remodel themselves and avoid dissolving into 
the “national melting pot.”21 However, it is too 
early to comment on the extent to which this 
has happened because cultural survival is often 
closely associated with the Ranas’ livelihoods.  
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